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in so far as it brings to a focus the different points of view on the matter. Again, while one admires the way in which our author pursues his aim without entangling himself in theories of perception, whether subjective or realistic, showing the representatives of these theories along with the common-sensist and the sceptic how they are affected by his strictures about sameness, one would have wished him to indicate which way of regarding knowledge seems to him freest of difficulties, as tested by the categories he is dealing in. The examination of Dr. McCosh's Realism may be regarded as a step in this direction. I question if the booklet ought to have been called a psychological study—epistemology it certainly is: there is almost no psychology in it; for had there been, one would have had the psychological solution of sameness as relative identity of content in presentations brought forward. The subject, I repeat, makes the book a crabbed one, but there are many passages where the thought has both range and rhythm. Much of the historical matter of the second part of the book will be of great use to students; the careful understanding the author shows of the prolix and prosaic Locke, and his acute criticism of Spencer's logic seems to me among the salient features of the book. There is a great similarity in tone, and method, and scope between this study and Dr. Pikler's recent volume on objective existence; both books to my mind represent the best sense in which philosophers may go "back" previously to going steadily onwards.

W. CALDWELL.

*Fundamental Problems. The Method of Philosophy as a Systematic Arrangement of Knowledge.* By Dr. PAUL CARUS. Second Edition, Enlarged and Revised. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1891. — pp. viii, 373.

This book consists of a series of sections, which set forth the principles of the Monistic Philosophy, as the author conceives of it. He devotes more than one hundred pages to answers to criticisms. It is very difficult to pronounce a judgment on the book; it is, in some respects, I suppose, a remarkable one. The characteristic of Dr. Carus's mind is its power of lucid condensation; and he gives us here, in readable and brilliant language, the main results of philosophy as "the systematic arrangement of knowledge." The student of philosophy would not inaptly characterize the author's point of view as a combination of Hegel and Spencer mediated through Comte. But my impression is, that the ordinary intelligent reader, who cannot be supposed to read between the lines, would, while admiring the eminent clearness of the book, feel in it a disappointing absence of a definite point of view. Unless it is very carefully shown how it is that the world is one, and can

be thought as one, Monism is apt to appear as somewhat otiose philosophy (πάντα καλά λίαν), and, as the outcome of philosophizing, hardly a pronounced step beyond the expression of the postulate with which all philosophy begins—that the world must be one. Nor, in this very regard, do I think does Dr. Carus help us much. His chapters show us how many so-called oppositions or dualisms are reconcilable with each other, but there is no evident connection between his chapters, which thus become a series of sketches [and there is an artistic play of light about them] rather than the logical development of a theory of knowledge and reality. It is easy to see how ideas and ideals and facts, how reason and sense, causation and free will, hedonism and asceticism, can all, and in fact all do, exist in the same world; how in fact the universe is God, and God is the universe; but what we want to say of a completed philosophy is one of two things, or perhaps both of them: either to know what aspect of reality is for us the highest aspect of reality, or to know what are the different points of view that the mind must take about the world, and how they can be logically connected. While the author has done wisely, it seems to me, in discarding the subjectivistic conclusions of the critical philosophy, I think he sinks too much the idea of criticism into that of realism, which latter idea too he carries out at the expense of what one might call a legitimate nominalism. The ethical outcome of Monism would, I fear, be indifferentism; what would save the system from that would be a tenable theory of individuality and of teleology. I do not mean to imply that a metaphysic should play into the hands of an ethic, but rather that the ethical facts should become at least part of the data of a philosophy. On the whole, the side of ethical showing that interests Dr. Carus is what is expressed in the *Schliesse dich an ein Ganzes* of Goethe, rather than in the *In suo esse conservari* of Spinoza or, for that part, of the evolutionist. His book, though, deserves study at the hands of all who have an interest in the development of philosophy.

W. CALDWELL.

*A Study of Greek Philosophy.* By ELLEN M. MITCHELL.  
With an Introduction by WILLIAM ROUNESVILLE ALGER. Chicago,  
S. C. Griggs & Co., 1891. — pp. xxviii, 282.

The ten pages of platitudes, which serve as introduction to this so-called "*Study*" of *Greek Philosophy*, awaken in the reader at the outset an unfavorable prognostication of the book. In the further reading of the volume this unfavorable impression receives some modification; though with a half-dozen reasonably good handbooks already on the market, it is not easy to find a justification for the appearance of this